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Introduction 
Conventionally, in competitive economic theory, it is assumed that price taking fmns and 
consumers have perfect information concerning market prices and other factors such as product 
and factor quality, and effort exerted by agents. In addition, it is common to appeal to the notion 
that firms and consumers passively respond to prices listed by the W alrasian auctioneer. The 
corollary of this is that a competitive equilibrium will ensure the efficient allocation of resources 
in factor and goods markets. As Stiglitz (1989) points out, not only has the Walrasian auctioneer 
"long been thought of as a convenient fiction" (p.771), but this "traditional view is fundamentally 
incomplete, incorrect and misleading" (p. 771 ). 
While such problems as imperfect competition, externalities and public goods are well-
known violations of the first-best optimum, it is only recently that important advances have been 
made in economic theory in analyzing the effects of imperfect information in markets (Stiglitz, 
1985). In particular, much of the literature can be characterized as having focused on the impact 
of two types of information problem that face economic agents. First, there are models that deal 
with the problem of adverse selection, which is where one party to a transaction is better 
informed than another about the characteristics of what is being bought and sold. Second. there 
are models that analyze the case of moral hazard, which is where one party has imperfect 
information concerning the action that another party takes. Essentially, once these types of 
information problems are taken into account, it may be the case that an efficient allocation of 
resources is not attainable through private actions, and, therefore, there may be a case for some 
form of government intervention (Stiglitz, 1985). 
In this context, the overall objective of this paper is to consider how the problem of 
imperfect information, as defined above, might impact resource allocation in a food system 
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increasingly characterized by some form of contracting, and to consider what the implications 
are, if any, for the traditional role of government as a supplier of market information to the food 
and agricultural sector. The conceptual framework that will be used to illustrate this problem is 
that of principal-agent. In particular, the main focus will be on the case of markets in which the 
relevant parties are in the agricultural and first stage processing/handling sectors. However, it 
should be recognized that the application is more general, and reference will be made to other 
contractual relationships in the food system. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 lays out the basic principal-agent problem, 
paying particular reference to contractual relationships between the agricultural and processing 
sectors. Section 2 develops the concept of principal-agent with respect to the trade-off between 
risk-sharing and effort incentives. Although, of necessity, this will be a very stylized view of 
such linkages in the food system, it will highlight the basic problem of imperfect infonnation in 
contracting settings and how this impacts the allocation of resources. Section 3 will then 
consider whether the existing public supply of information is relevant to the resolution of these 
information problems. Section 4 will briefly consider other contractual relationships in the food 
system, while Section 5 summarizes. 
1. Principal-Agent and Contracting in the Food System 
One of the most striking features of structural change in the food system over the past 
three decades has been the shift in several agricultural commodity markets away from spot 
transactions to some form of production/marketing contract between farmers and first-stage 
processors/handlers (Barkema, Drabenstott and Welch, 1991; Barkema, 1994; O'Brien, 1994; 
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Drabenstott, 1994). These can range from market-specification contracts through production-
management contracts to resource-providing contracts. The best-known, and best-documented 
of these structural changes has been the case of the broiler industry, where the share of broilers 
produced under contract is about 90 percent, and traditional spot markets no longer exist 
(Knoeber, 1989). Other markets where contracting is important include, turkeys, eggs, fruits, 
vegetables, and sugar beet. More recently, the pork industry has exhibited a trend towards 
contracting between hog farmers and pork processors (Barkema; Barkema and Cook, 1993; 
Drabenstott, 1994; Hurt, 1994), about 18 percent of production in 1990 being accounted for by 
contracts, compared to 1.5 percent in 1980 (O'Brien). Drabenstott argues that this process of 
"industrialization" appears to be accelerating, and he predicts that contracting will continue to 
characterize structural change in the pork industry, with cattle feeding following a similar path 
in the future. 
In the case of broilers, coordination of production is undertaken by firms known as 
integrators, for example, Tyson, Perdue and Holly Farms. The key characteristic of this system 
is that the integrator contracts with growers to raise chickens to maturity. Baby chicks, feed, 
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medical services and managerial advice are provided to the grower by the integrator, while 
capital, in the form of chicken houses, and labor are provided by the grower (Knoeber). Similar 
types of arrangement also characterize the use of contracts in the pork industry, where the hog 
farmer supplies capital and labor, while the contractor provides young pigs, feed, medical services 
and managerial advice (Barkema; Barkema and Cook; Hurt). 
The economic rationale for this type of market arrangement has been thorough! y covered 
elsewhere in the literature (Sporleder, 1992), the standard explanations referring to finns either 
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responding to risk in dimensions such as price and quality, changes in production technology and 
the potential for realizing economies of scale, or transactions costs. In addition, these structural 
changes have to be set in the context of an environment of changing consumer tastes and the 
need to target niche markets (Barkema et al.; Drabenstott). However, the key to understanding 
the nature and impact of imperfect information in a marketing system increasingly characterized 
by contracting is that such economic arrangements have the characteristics of a principal-agent 
problem, where the fanner/grower is the agent, and the contractor is the principal. It should be 
noted that this is by no means an original observation, Barry, Sonka, and Lajili (1992) having 
already referred to the notion of agency relationships in the food system. 
Following Stiglitz (1987), the standard principal-agent problem is one where a principal 
(the first-stage processor/handler) is seeking a contract with an agent (the fanner) that will 
maximize the principal's expected utility. This is contingent on the agent (the farmer) 
undertaking some set of actions to maximize their own expected utility given the compensation 
scheme, and that the agent is willing to undertake the contract, ie. the contract makes the agent 
no worse off than their next best opportunity U (the rationality constraint)1• Formally, suppose 
the compensation scheme Y depends only on the output of some agricultural commodity X that 
is observable to both principal and agent: 
y == <jl(X) (1) 
where the parameter ~ defines the relationship between the payment scheme Y and the level of 
output X. 
1 We are assuming here that both the principal and agent's preferences are in accord with the von-Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms of expected utility (see Hey, 1979). 
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Suppose then that the output of X is a function of both effort by the agent e2, and some 
chance productivity factor 63: 
x = f(e,e) (2) 
The agent will exert effort to maximize expected utility EU which is a function of both income 
(positive utility) and effort, which is assumed unpleasant (negative utility): 
max EU(Y,e,9) (3) 
The expected utility of the principal EV depends on the effort of the agent. the payments made 
to the agent, and the state of the world e: 
EV = EV[<P(X),e,9] (4) 
The principal's objective is to choose cp, and, hence, the payment scheme, in order to maximize 
EV, recognizing that the agent's effort e depends on cp, and that the payment scheme must satisfy 
the agent's rationality constraint 0'. 
As will be discussed in the next section, it turns out that the optimal contract offered by 
the principal will depend upon both the principal's and agent's attitude towards risk and the 
extent of moral hazard. In particular, contracts will reflect a trade-off between the extent to 
which the principal will be willing to provide insurance to the agent as opposed to the need to 
give them incentives to exert effort, given that the agent's effort may not be perfectly and 
costlessly observable by the principal. 
2 Effort is treated as a catch-all here in order to cover aspects such as achieving the right product quality. 
3 For example, high temperature, and disease such as Marek's disease, reduces broiler output 
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2. Risk-Sharing and Effort Incentives 
(i) Efficient Risk-Sharing 
In the simplest setting4 , suppose the agent's effort e cannot be observed by the principal, 
but that e is verifiable by both parties. In these circumstances the principal can provide 
incentives to the agent because both principal and agent can establish the outcome X of a given 
amount of effort e in various states of the world e. Therefore, the compensation scheme can be 
made a function of both the outcome X and the state of the world e. The principal could offer 
a payment scheme Y of the following form: 
Y = [P(X) - k(e)] (5) 
where P(X) is the price the principal can sell the output at, and k(e) is a state dependent 
"franchise fee" that the principal extracts5• Essentially, the agent is motivated to exert effort 
because they are made the residual claimant, i.e. the results of extra effort always accrue to the 
agent. The nature of k(e) will determine the extent to which risk will be shared between the 
principal and the agent. 
Suppose that k(S) is a constant k whatever the state of the world. The willingness of the 
agent to accept this contract will depend on their attitude towards risk. If the agent were risk 
4 This draws heavily on Ricketts (1987), and Sappington (1991). 
5 In practice, in a contracting relationship between farmers and first-stage processors, the agent's output would 
undergo some form of processing, therefore, P(X) would be related in some way to the price that the principal 
receives for the processed output In addition, to keep the problem simple, P(X) is not treated as random, although, 
as Antonovitz points out in her discussion of this paper, the principal might face a good deal of price uncertainty. 
In terms of the contracting relationship, the principal has to provide incentives to the agent, irrespective of 
downstream price uncertainty, however, in terms of the principal's willingness to bear risk, downstream price 
uncertainty may be important, depending on the principal's attitude to risk. If the principal is risk neutral, 
downstream price risk does not matter, if, on the other hand, the principal is risk averse, the contract may require 
the agent to bear some of the price as well as output risk, although the principal may be able to use other instruments 
such as futures contracts to hedge the price risk. 
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neutral, they would accept this contract6• However, it seems more reasonable to assume that, 
in the case of contracting in the food system, agents (farmers/growers) are risk averse, while 
principals such as the broiler integrators and pork producers are risk neutral. In this case, a risk· 
averse agent would not accept the contract as they would have to bear all the output risk and 
effectively insure the principal against uncertainty. Ideally, a risk-neutral principal should bear 
the entire risk7• In particular, a fixed payment could be made to the agent whatever the state 
of the world, as long as the standard effort e is exerted. This point is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Suppose that there are only two output outcomes X1 and X2, X1>X2, which occur with 
probabilities 1t1 and 1t2=(1·1t1), and, for the moment, assume that these outcomes are independent 
of effort The dimensions of the box in Figure 1 represent the value of output P(X), which, 
under the terms of the contract, is split between the principal and agent The horizontal and 
vertical dimensions represent the value of output P(X1) and P(XJ respectively, and 0 A and Op are 
the origins of the agent and principal respectively. UA and UA'• and Up and Up' are lines of 
constant expected utility (indifference curves) for the agent and principal respectively, their shape 
being dependent on their attitudes to risk, while the 45° lines are the certainty outcome lines, 
along which the slopes of the indifference curves are equal to the slope of the constant expected 
outcome line8• As drawn, the agent is assumed to be risk averse such that a move from point 
t to point r would result in a lower level of expected utility as the agent is unwilling to accept 
a "fair" gamble, the move from t to r having an expected value of zero. In contrast, the principal 
6 Risk neutrality is where an individual is indifferent between a certain outcome and a random outcome with the 
same expected value (a "fair" gamble), while risk aversion is where the individual never accepts the random outcome. 
7 If both principal and agent were risk averse, they would both have to bear some risk. 
8 Formally, the expected outcome is given as E--n1(Y~)+1t:z(Y~) 
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is assumed to be risk neutral, a move from point r to t being acceptable as the principal is 
indifferent between points r and t. 
Figure 1: Efficient Risk-Sharing 
The core risk-bearing characteristics of the contract between principal and agent can now 
be highlighted. Suppose the initial contract offered allows for a fixed payment k to the principal, 
i.e. at point r. At this point the agent bears all the risk due to the chance factor 8. Therefore, 
any contract in the shaded set would be a Pareto improvement on r. In particular, contracts 
between s and t, along the agent's certainty line would be efficient, e.g. a move from r to t makes 
the agent better off and the principal no worse off, the principal offering 'fair' insurance to the 
agent A move from r to s would make the principal better off, even though they bear all of the 
risk, while the agent maintains their level of expected utility. 
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The key point to this analysis is that if the principal can reasonably infer the agent's effort 
from observed output and verification of the state of the world e, then it is optimal for the 
principal to offer complete insurance to the agent, and the payment scheme has the characteristics 
of a pure time-rate contract, i.e. at the end of each period, the agent receives a certain payment 
whatever the outcome of 99• 
(ii) Prevention of Shirking 
Unfortunately, if the principal cannot observe e, the problem of moral hazard now arises 
in the principal-agent relationship. In particular, as the compensation scheme Y now depends 
on observable output X only, then offering the agent a fixed payment each period provides the 
agent with no incentive to exert effort, i.e. the possibility of shirking arises (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972). Essentially, the imperfect information problem exists because the principal 
cannot observe the agent's effort and it may be too costly to attempt to monitor that effort_ For 
example, Knoeber reports that in the case of broilers, measuring growers' effort in terms of hours 
and diligence would be a costly activity, growers' performance instead being measured in terms 
of pounds of broiler meat produced, given the chicks and feed supplied to the grower by the 
integrator. 
In order for the agent to be provided with some incentive not to shirk, some of the risk 
will have to be borne by them. In particular, the contract will have to contain some element of 
piece-rate incentives. Suppose, therefore, that the probability of a good or bad outcome due to 
the chance factor a is not merely given, but can be influenced by the agent's effort, i.e. the 
9 See Stiglitz (1975) for a discussion of contract types. 
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probability of a good outcome n:1 increases to n:i when e is exerted, which will affect the agent's 
and principal's indifference maps. 
Figure 2: Risk-Sharing and Incentives 
In Figure 2, point s on the agent's certainty line is the contract offered when e is 
observable by the principal, with associated indifference curves of UA and Up respectively. With 
an increase in effort by the agent to e, the agent's indifference curve becomes U!, which is 
steeperl0• While this yields the same level of utility as that of less effort, effort is assumed to 
be unpleasant for the agent For example, the distance st along the agent's certainty line 
measures the cost of effort. However, at point x, the agent is indifferent between effort and no 
effort, and to the right of x, between U! and U A• the agent prefers effort as a higher level of 
utility can be reached without effort. 
10 Along the certainty line, the slope of the indifference curves increases from -(~/1-~) to -(nf/1-xD. 
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The effort exerted by the agent also changes the slope of the principal's indifference 
curve, which now becomes D;, which intersects the indifference curve Up at point c on the 
principal's certainty line, i.e. a certain outcome for the principal is independent of any effort by 
the agent. The shaded area wxy is the set of potential Pareto improvements on the original 
contract at s. In particular, efficient contracts will lie along the boundary between x and w, 
where the agent will just be induced to exert effort e. 
The key here is that in order to induce effort on the part of the agent, the principal will 
not offer a contract giving complete insurance against risk when effort and the chance factor e 
are not observable by the principal. Essentially, there is a trade-off between efficient risk-sharing 
and the need to provide incentives. In particular, contracts that will just induce the agent to exert 
effort will likely contain an element of both a time-rate and a piece-rate11• This seems fairly 
typical of contracts in the pork industry where the farmer is paid a flat fee plus various 
performance incentives to feed young pigs to market weight (Barkema; Barkema and Cook). In 
terms of the allocation of resources, the use of piece-rates means that unlike a pure time-rate 
contract, agents will be paid the marginal product of their increased effort. 
(iii) Tournaments vs. Piece-Rates 
As Stiglitz (1975) has shown, piece-rates will tend to be used as the method of 
compensation when the risk is small, the agent's risk aversion is low, and the supply elasticity 
of effort is high, i.e. there are strong incentive effects. In addition, as noted by Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz (1983), the problem with piece-rates is that they are a very inflexible incentive structure 
as it is costly to adapt them. This may not be a problem in the case of a single agent, or even 
1 1 The pure piece-rate would be given by the diagonal of the box in Figure 2. 
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a few agents, however, in the case of multiple agents, piece-rates may not be an optimal 
compensation system. In particular, if there is rapid technological change in production, 
renegotiation of multiple contracts would be costly. Interestingly, in the case of the broiler 
industry, integrators have adopted a compensation structure that appears to provide risk and 
incentive advantages over a piece-rate system. Essentially, integrators in the broiler industry 
operate tournaments among multiple agents. 
Tournaments, which have been analyzed in the principal-agent literature by, among others, 
Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuff and Stiglitz, are compensation 
schemes where each contestant (grower) is paid on the basis of their performance relative to other 
contestants. The payment scheme can be based either on an agent's rank in the tournament. or, 
as is usually the case in broilers, an agent's performance is measured relative to average agent 
performance. Knoeber discusses this type of payment scheme in detail with respect to broilers. 
A grower's payment under contract is given as: 
Y, = (b + asc - sci) (6) 
Yi is the grower's compensation per pound and b is the base payment per pound, i.e. there is an 
element of time-rate in the contract that provides some insurance to the grower against risk. asc 
is the average settlement cost, where settlement cost is the sum of chick costs, medical costs, and 
feed costs per live pound, averaged across a number of growers who harvest at around the same 
time. sci is the settlement cost of the individual grower. Therefore, if a grower's performance 
is above average, their settlement cost sci will be below the average and the grower receives a 
bonus. Essentially, the measure of settlement cost provides an incentive to the grower to reduce 
chick mortality, produce heavier birds, and increase feed conversion efficiency. 
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In theory, how do tournaments work? Following Nalebuff and Stiglitz, it is useful to re-
write the output function (2) for the i 111 agent as follows: 
(7) 
As before, the agent's output Yi is observable to the principal, and it is a function of the agent's 
effort e,, the chance factor 8, which is assumed common to all agents, and~\ which an agent's 
idiosyncratic risk. In the case of broilers, agents are usually located in the same geographic area, 
and so can be faced with substantial common shocks due to both temperature and disease, and, 
also chick and feed quality. Therefore, the compensation scheme of comparing average 
settlement costs to individual grower's settlement costs means that exogenous shocks common 
to all growers will be differenced out With enough agents, only idiosyncratic risk ~. which 
relates to individual agent's abilities, need be borne by agents (Nalebuff and Stiglitz). 
Consequently, it is argued that tournament-type compensation schemes will reduce risks for the 
agents, but at the same time provide incentive for effort. 
There are other important characteristics of tournaments that aid in resolving the problem 
of moral hazard. In particular, in order to motivate effort among agents, winners, i.e. those that 
have below average settlement costs, will tend to receive more than their marginal product of 
effort. All agents believe that by exerting more effort, they will increase their chances of 
receiving a bonus in the tournament Therefore, if all agents work harder, the compensation 
scheme must reflect that In addition, as Knoeber notes, the types of tournament operated in 
broilers have some incentive characteristics that make them preferable to rank-order tournaments. 
In a rank-order tournament, it only pays to win by a little, whereas in a tournament where the 
size of the bonus depends on the deviation of performance from average, it pays to win by a lot 
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Therefore, marginal incentives are preserved, unlike in rank-order tournaments where competition 
to win can become unstable, such that both the least and best able contestants give up. 
Incentives are also reinforced by the fact that individual agent's payments are based on a 
comparison with an average level of performance, about which the principal has no incentive to 
(iv) Adverse Selection 
Up to this point, nothing has been said about the imperfect information problem that the 
principal faces in terms of selecting agents. Much of the literature has focused either on auctions 
to resolve this problem (McAfee and McMillan, 1987), or on some form of market signalling 
(Spence, 1974; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). In the case of contracting in agriculture, it would 
seem that, at least in the case of the broiler and hog industries, that the provision of capital by 
the grower is a means of screening agents. This capital is substantial, and it would appear to 
serve two functions (Knoeber). First, the willingness of agents to purchase capital can be 
regarded as a signal of agent ability, so that, in a sense, the capital requirement results in the self-
selection of high-quality agents. Second, the provision of capital by the agent is a bond assuring 
future grower performance, i.e. even though growers may receive a certain base payment, there 
is an incentive to exert effort to generate a return on a long-lived asset. 
12 For example. overstating the settlement costs of one grower would obviously lower that grower·s 
compensation, but it would also lower the average performance by which other growers are evaluated, which would 
not be in the interests of the principal. 
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3. Supply of Public Information and Contracting 
The previous section outlined how the increased use of contracting in the food system can 
be characterized by the existence of informational problems such as moral hazard. However, it 
was also shown that, even in the absence of perfect information on the part of the principal, a.'1d 
uncertainty for the agent(s), the parties to a contract can adapt in such a way as to address this 
problem. In particular, contracts can be written between principal and agent(s) that afford the 
agent(s) some insurance against risk, but at the same time provide incentives for effort, and, 
hence, provide signals for an efficient allocation of resources. The question then arises as to 
whether the government can supply additional information that will address the issues of moral 
hazard and adverse selection in a marketing system that is increasingly characterized by 
contracting. 
The existing public supply of information to the food and agricultural sector can basically 
be divided into two types, current price information and commodity outlook information. The 
history and development of the former has been thoroughly reviewed by Henderson, Schrader and 
Rhodes (1983), while the latter was discussed in a paper by Irwin (1994) presented at these 
meetings last year. The underlying rationale for the public supply of both these types of 
information is the notion that information is a public good. Information is a public good in the 
sense that one economic agent's use of it does not affect the access of other agents to that 
information. As a result, it is argued that there will be an undersupply of information from the 
private sector because of the problem of non-appropriability. 
Public price reporting has generally been aimed at reporting spot market prices of 
commodities which still retain their identity, and, in the case of commodities where there is 
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farmer/processor integration, prices are reported at the first sale of the processed product, e.g. 
processed broilers and turkeys. Public price reporting had its roots in concerns over the 
possibility that fanners were being exploited by processors and other traders of agricultural 
commodities, but has subsequently been justified on the grounds that it aids economic efficiency 
in the food marketing system (Henderson et al.). In particular, it is argued that price reports 
provide the benefits of a central market without the need for all market participants and products 
to be in a single location. In addition, by establishing product value, exchange is facilitated. 
In the case of commodity outlook information, the basic objective has been to supply 
forecasts of future prices and quantities, given that decision makers are operating in an 
environment of uncertainty about these variables. In aiding resource allocation decisions, it is 
expected that outlook information will result in higher profits, increased utility and, hence, greater 
social welfare (Freebairn, 1978). As Irwin notes, the public supply of outlook information to 
agriculture has begun to be questioned in recent years. To some extent the public good argument 
has been weakened because of the growth in the supply of information from the private sector 
(Just, 1983). In addition, Irwin argues that the rational expectations revolution has posed an 
important challenge to the public supply of information. If economic agents utilize available 
information optimally at the margin and do not make systematic forecast errors, then resource 
allocation and, hence, social welfare cannot be improved through the supply of public information 
on, say, future market prices. However, this rather strict interpretation of rational expectations 
assumes that information is costless and that economic agents learn instantaneously from their 
forecast errors. Therefore, as Irwin argues, the public supply of information may be a means to 
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aid a convergence towards a rational expectations equilibrium, and as a result will increase social 
welfare. 
In an environment of increased contracting do these arguments for the public supply of 
information make sense, and does the information currently supplied address the problem of 
imperfect information? In the case of public price reporting, the decline in the use of spot 
markets means that either publicly reported spot prices disappear altogether or that they reflect 
such thinly traded markets that they are no longer of any real economic benefit. On the face of 
it this seems to suggest a potential loss of economic welfare. In particular, principal and agent(s) 
have no basis on which to conduct negotiations over compensation, and related to this there is 
the possibility that agents will be subject to monopsonistic behavior by the principal. However, 
the forces pushing markets towards contracting, and the logic of the principal-agent model 
suggest that a welfare loss will not necessarily occur. For example, in the case of the pork 
industry, Barkema and Cook, and Drabenstott argue that traditional price signals have become 
inadequate in terms of transmitting consumer demands through the food system to producers, 
hence the shift to contracting by the processors, i.e. there was a market failure. Contracts allow 
the principal to provide the agent(s) with much more precise product specifications, and because 
of both the agent's rationality constraint, and the need to provide incentives to avoid the moral 
hazard problem, there is no reason to believe it would be rational for the principal to not provide 
agents with the correct incentives and act monopsonistically. This argument is particularly valid 
in the case of broilers where the use of tournaments provides the potential for payments to 
growers in excess of marginal product, plus there is an incentive for truthful revelation on the 
part of the integrator in tenns of settlement costs. 
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In the case of publicly provided commodity outlook information, the traditional argument 
has been that if fanners are risk averse, then information that reduces the degree of uncertainty 
will aid both their production decisions and increase their welfare (Freebaim). However, as was 
argued earlier, contracting does provide a degree of insurance to agents against production risk, 
and, hence, reduces the need for the public supply of outlook information. Nevertheless, while 
agents do benefit from a reduction in short-term production risk, they may still be exposed to 
long-run capital risk through the principal's requirement that they supply the necessary production 
capital. This suggests that there would be economic value to information on the long-run 
prospects for demand for the principal's product, and, hence the potential rate of return to capital. 
In addition, although the principal reduces input supply risk through contracting, they are exposed 
to additional risk through the shifting to them of some of the agent's production risk in contracts, 
and, as noted earlier, they may also be subject to downstream price risk. This may not matter 
if the principal is risk neutral, but it does suggest that there may be a premium on information 
on future consumer needs for the processed product, and detailed information on retail prices. 
However, it is not obvious how the public supply of price information can help in dealing with 
the problem of imperfect information. 
In summary, traditional supplies of public information to the food system may no longer 
be relevant where there is increased reliance on contracting. This follows from the fact that 
contracts provide some insurance against risk to producers, and the principal, in dealing with the 
problem of moral hazard, has to provide incentives for effort to producers. However, there may 
be a need for the public supply of information further downstream in the marketing system, 
which would aid farmers in their capital investment decisions as they consider either entering 
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contractual arrangements or exiting the industry if they are already small-scale independent 
producers. In addition, such information may aid in reducing price uncertainty facing processors, 
however, it is moot whether this should be supplied publicly to large corporations well able to 
bear risk. 
4. Imperfect Information and Other Contractual Relationships in the Food System 
It should be obvious that the problem of imperfect information is not peculiar to 
contracting between the agricultural sector and first-stage processors/handlers. For example, the 
well-known 'lemons problem' (Akerlof, 1970) refers to the possibility of adverse selection in the 
sale of, say, high-quality products. Where consumers are unable to verify the stated quality of 
products prior to purchase, it is argued that all fmns will have an incentive to supply low-quality 
products at a high-quality price. Therefore, without some means of credibly signalling quality, 
high-quality goods will never be supplied in equilibrium. Nevertheless, the literature has shown 
that if fmns pre-commit to investments in fum-specific assets such as brand names, then 
consumers treat this as a credible signal of quality (Klein and Leffler, 1981). The repeat-
purchase mechanism ensures that any firm who cheats will be punished by consumers. In the 
case of food marketing, this seems a reasonable argument for branded food products, although 
it does not necessarily ensure that dimensions such as food safety can be guaranteed by private 
agents. 
Interestingly, this particular problem, along with that of moral hazard, may characterize 
contractual relationships between food manufacturers and food retailers. The modern theory of 
vertical market relationships can be thought of as a particular class of the principal-agent problem 
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(Rey and Tirole, 1986; Katz, 1989). Essentially, a manufacturer (principal) wants to set a 
contract that induces the retailer (agent) to act in such a way as to maximize the sum of expected 
profits of the two levels of the marketing system, and which also enables the manufacturer to 
appropriate all of these profits. 
Much of the theory of vertical markets deals with principal-agent problems where there 
is no exogenous uncertainty about the environment when the contract is signed, so risk aversion 
on the part of the agent is irrelevant. In such an environment, the focus is on establishing what 
is a sufficient vertical restraint that will just maximize vertical profits by removing vertical 
externalities such as successive mark-ups at different stages of the market system {double 
marginalization). More interesting than the above is the case identified by Rey and Tirole where 
the principal cannot observe effort on the part of the retailer, and the retailer also faces uncertain 
demand. In these circumstances, the retailer will require a contract that provides it with some 
degree of insurance if it is risk averse, but at the same time the manufacturer has to provide the 
retailer with some incentive to maximize vertical profits. 
In the case of the food industry, it seems to be common for food manufacturers to offer 
non-linear contracts to retailers that are made up of a wholesale price plus a negative franchise 
fee, commonly known as a slotting allowance (McLaughlin and Rao, 1990; Shaffer, 1991). On 
the face of it, these negative franchise fees look like the rental price of scarce shelf-space in 
supermarket outlets, however, they may be more subtle than this. McLaughlin and Fredericks 
(1994) report that in 1991, 16,000 new products were introduced onto supermarket shelves, 
compared to about 1000 per annum in the 1970s. At the same time, there seems to be quite a 
high failure/disappearance rate of these new products, about 50 percent of new products being 
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discontinued within a year of introduction. This suggests that retailers face an uncertain demand 
for large numbers of new, differentiated food products. 
Theory suggests that, in the absence of demand uncertainty, manufacturers could charge 
a wholesale price at marginal cost in order to induce optimal effort from the retailer, and then 
extract the retailer's rents through a positive franchise fee (Mathewson and Winter, 1984). 
However, with uncertain demand, limited shelf-space, and a large number of new product 
introductions, it would appear that negative franchise fees, in the form slotting allowances, and 
other types of allowance such as display and merchandising allowances, are serving two purposes. 
First, demand for such allowances is aimed at dealing with the adverse selection problem, i.e. the 
retailer uses slotting allowances as an screening device against really bad 'lemons •, and, second, 
these allowances are also providing the retailer with some insurance against potential product 
failure and some incentive to exert effort in selling them. Presumably, although this is 
speculation, the manufacturers are attempting to extract some of the retail rents by setting 
wholesale prices in excess of marginal cost. The point here is that private markets can adapt to 
the problem of imperfect information, although one might argue that manufacturers could do a 
lot better job at initial market research before introducing new products. 
5. Summary 
This paper has focused on the problem of imperfect information in the food system. In 
particular, the case of contracting between farmers and frrst-stage processors/handlers was 
examined in a principal-agent setting in order to highlight the informational problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection that the principal faces. The analysis indicates that, while contracts 
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can offer agents some degree of insurance from risk, full insurance cannot be offered because 
of the need to provide incentives at the margin for agents to exert effort. It was also argued that 
because economic agents adapt to problems of imperfect information, there may not be much of 
a case for public intervention, at least in terms of dealing with the problem of moral hazard in 
contractual relationships. However, public supply of information on retail prices and long-term 
trends in consumption patterns may be relevant for resolving downstream uncertainties that the 
principal faces. 
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